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Abstract
In the last few years, a body of ideas based on political economy
theory has been built up by North and Weingast, Olson, Przeworski,
and Acemoglu and Robinson. One theme that emerges from this lit-
erature concerns the transition to democracy: why would dominant
elites give up oligarchic power? This paper addresses this question
by considering a formal model of an authoritarian regime, and then
examining three historical regimes: the Argentine Junta of 1976-1983;
Francoist Spain ,1938-1975; the Soviet System ,1924-1991. We argue
that these historical analyses suggest that party dictatorships are more
institutionally durable than military or fascist ones.
Key words: Democratic Transition, Authoritarian Regimes, Ratio-
nal Choice Theory.
1 Introduction
At least since Machiavelli￿ s time, political scientists have studied how gov-
ernment structure in￿ uences regime durability. Today, with democracy as-
cendant over dictatorship in most of the world, political scientists have at-
tempted to construct models of the transition to democracy, and have also
examined how it is that autocratic regimes can stay in power, and why
some apparently democratic regimes can fall back into semi-dictatorship.1
Zimbabwe, under the autocratic rule of Mugabe since 1980, currently has
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1in￿ ation of 15,000% and unemployment of 80% (as of July 2007). A country
like Zimbabwe is likely to fall into civil war. Whether this may lead even-
tually to democracy or further debilitating civil war is a matter of debate.2
While Przeworski has noted that once a political economy reaches a GDP
of about $7000/capita ( in PPI or purchasing parity terms) it is unlikely
to fall back from democracy to autocracy, it is still the case that resource
rich economies like Iran (at current GDP/capita of $8400), Kazahkstan (at
$8300) and China (at $6800) are autocracies. Perhaps more alarmingly,
Russia has invented the institution of ￿sovereign democracy￿ , a kind of oli-
garchic democracy.3
This paper contends that to understand autocracies and the possibility
of a transformation to democracy, it is appropriate to construct a model that
is general enough to be able to incorporate both democratic and autocratic
institutions.
We ￿rst start with the political economic assumption that power derives
from the control of the factors of capital, land and labor. The allocation
of these factors can be desribed by a point in a high dimensional economic
factor space. For purposes of exposition, Figure 1 gives an extreme simpli-
￿cation of this idea, representing the factor space as a horizontal axis with
Labor/Land at one end and Capital at the other. Perpendicular to the eco-
nomic space is the political space. Again, for puposes of exposition, we can
assume this space is uni-dimensional. In modern democracies, this axis can
be identi￿ed with civil and social rights. [Insert Figure 1 here]
The idea underlying this ￿gure follows from the work of North and
Weingast; as applied by Scho￿eld to examine the political bargains insti-
tuted in Britain in the 1740￿ s and the United States in 1787-1800.4
For example, the ability of Britain to deal with the debt associated with
its wars with France in the eighteenth century depended on the willingness
of the landed and capitalist elite to commit to payment on the escalating
interest on the debt. This was done by a complex bargain between Whig
and Tories, involving high excise and customs taxes. Since this protected
the landed interest, it had the the indirect e⁄ect of raising the value of
land. The second indirect e⁄ect was that the poor su⁄ered. Scho￿eld has
argued that for this bargain to be maintained, it was necessary to restrict the
franchise. The reform acts and the repeal of the corn laws came much later,
in response to the fear of starvation and civilian unrest. In the United States
in the period up to the election of Je⁄erson in 1800, capital and landed elites
were in con￿ ict over whether a similar bargain could be instituted. A tari⁄
would protect manufactures, thus raising the price of capital intensive goods
in terms of the price of land. The contract that was put in place gave the
2landed interest the upper hand, by suppressing the question of slavery (on
the political axis) until at least 1850-1860.
These comments are meant to suggest that the political economic equi-
librium in a society is the result of a bargain between the elite holders of
factors, and those who govern the institutions. A political leader, whether
democratically elected, or holding onto power by force, must have enough
support from the elite or the people, or both, to stay in power. The formal
model of power that is used here has the following features:
Firstly, each factor elite has an ellipsoidal utility function, as illustrated
in Figures 1 and 2, indicating their primary concern with that factor. Sim-
ilarly the political elite, whether autocrat or prime minister or president,
is less interested in the particular disposition of factors, but rather in their
utilization in order to maintain power. As Figure 2 illustrates, the partic-
ular assumption on elite utilities allows the economic and political elite to
bargain. Figure 2 presents a contract curve between the capital elite and an
autocrat, representing the set of bargains that are possible.[Insert Figure 2
here].
In some autocratic regimes, of course, the "autocrat" can be identi￿ed
with a military elite. In this case, the contract curve speci￿es the nature of
the resources, military and capitalistic, that can be made available to the
political leader. Again, it is not crucial that the bargain be only between
capital and the political or military elite. It is quite possible in some regimes
that the landed elite control the critical factor. The resources made available
by this contract can then used to maintain political power.
In the formal model, each member of the population has a utility func-
tion, based partly on some preferred position in the factor space, but also on
what we call the valences of the various political leaders. The formal model
distinguishes between exogenous (or intrinsic) valence and the valence that
results from the resouces made available to the political leader by the factor
elite. As an example, ￿lm of the crowd￿ s response to Mussolini when he
came to power suggests that the people regarded him very highly, at least
initially. Revolutionary leaders, such as Castro, also have very high intrinsic
valence. Autocrats, like Mugabe may be hated by some of the people, but
can keep power through intimidation, precisely because of their control of
resources. While the contract curve speci￿es the locus of actions that maxi-
mizes resources, the balance locus gives the equilibrium locus of the political
leader. In a democratic regime, this will depend on the intrinsic valences
of political opponents and the activist contributions. In the model used
here, the equilibrium position of the leader will be a weighted sum of the
preferred positions of those with some power in the polity (the selectorate).
3In both models, the leader with greater intrinsic valence will be less depen-
dent on the resource support of activists or the factor elite. Moreover, the
greater the intrinsic valence of an opponent, whether a revolutionary or a
leader of a democratically chosen opposition, the further will the leader￿ s
position be from the center. In Figure 2, the point denoted ￿the mean of
the selectorate￿is used to denote the center.5
One obvious inference from this model is that the ￿equilibrium￿posi-
tion of the autocrat may be so far from the center that the populace will be
induced to revolution. On the other hand, some authoritarian systems have
evolved so that the ￿autocratic equilibrium￿is stable. While we cannot over-
look culture and historical distinctiveness, the authoritarian government￿ s
institutional design almost certainly contributes to its relative durability.
By applying the model just proposed, we suggest we can pinpoint which au-
thoritarian systems are more durable and why. Three types of authoritarian
regimes have predominated in the twentieth-century: bureaucratic military
dictatorship, fascist dictatorship, and the communist party dictatorship.
Applying the model suggests that the military bureaucratic regime seems
the least durable, fascism more durable, and the socialist party dictator-
ship very stable. To illustrate, we examine three regimes: Argentina￿ s mili-
tary junta (1976-1983) , Francoist Spain (1938-1975), and the Soviet system
(1924-1991).6 We show how the theoretical prerequisites for regime change
to democracy were sequentially harder to meet. The prerequisites include:
(1) enough economic and or political inequality to induce an oppositional
underclass to demand formally institutionalizing some power redistribution.
(2) not so much inequality in economic or political power that the au-
thoritarian elite is willing to incur almost any cost to keep power.
(3) the ability of the regime￿ s opponents to overcome the collective action
problem inherent in organizing a revolution.
(4) for democracy to be achieved, reformers within the authoritarian bloc
must align themselves with moderate opposition leaders to force authoritar-
ian hardliners into accepting transition.
Argentina￿ s wealth and political power distribution were neither egali-
tarian nor acutely concentrated. Spain￿ s economic inequality was not pro-
foundly di⁄erent from Argentina￿ s but its political organization was more
centralized. The Soviet system both brutally imposed comparative eco-
nomic egalitarianism and sharply concentrated political power. This re-
duced the revolution￿ s economic boon to the citizenry while encouraging the
government to spare nothing to defend its power. Francoism￿ s early corpo-
ratism raised Spain￿ s hurdle for oppositional collective action higher than
Argentina￿ s and Soviet party-oriented social organization raised it higher
4still.
The Argentine junta could not e⁄ectively penetrate or balkanize the or-
ganizations that kept their regime in power. This a⁄orded some of the
regime￿ s erstwhile supporters enough autonomy to negotiate with the oppo-
sition and pressure the authoritarian elite to reach an accommodation with
them.
Although Franco￿ s regime also could not e⁄ectively penetrate and balka-
nize certain support organizations, Franco￿ s complete personal control over
the cabinet helped him manipulate the power distribution within his elite,
hampering any single Francoist faction from attaining enough power to com-
bine with the opposition and tie his hands. Without Franco, the system
disintegrated.
Lastly, the Soviet system centralized all personnel decisions, for organi-
zations that propped up the government, within the apparatus of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union￿ s (CPSU). This precluded the emergence
of an autonomous Reformist clique within the Soviet political elite without
the General Secretary￿ s consent.
Our analysis depends on Przeworki￿ s observation that the ability of the
elite and the citizenry to compromise depends on their cohesiveness. Prze-
worki follows O￿ Donnell (1978) by dividing society into four political actors:
Hardliners and Reformers in the authoritarian elite and Moderates and Rad-
icals in the oppositional citizenry. Hardliners have the most vested interest
in the regime. In the Soviet Union, the Communist Party apparatus and
KGB were prominent Hardliners. Franco himself and the Falange were the
Spanish Hardliners and in Argentina the Hardliners were the military brass.
￿Reformers tend to be recruited from among the politicians of the [author-
itarian] regime and from some groups outside the state apparatus: sectors
of the bourgeoisie under capitalism, and some economic managers under
socialism.￿ 7 Reformers maintain weaker bonds to the regime and some may
even gain from regime change if it leads to a [centrist] voter on the economic
or power axis closer to themselves. Moderates want regime change but
can accept some institutionalized commitments to elites that temper regime
change￿ s power redistribution. The Radicals, furthest away from Hardlin-
ers on the economic and political axes, oppose most concessions short of
thorough institutional overhaul in their own favor. Clearly, the Hardlin-
ers are the elite, Radicals the citizenry, and Reformers and Moderates a
￿bifurcated￿middle class.
Przeworski argues that regime change ￿can result only from an under-
standing between Reformers and Moderates￿and then only when ￿an agree-
ment can be reached between Reformers and Moderates to establish institu-
5tions under which the social forces they represent would have a signi￿cant
political presence in the democratic [or successor] system.￿ 8 Reformers and
Moderates sometimes secure Hardliners￿and Radicals￿assent to agreements
with convincing rhetoric. However, typically, the Reformers and Moderates
must either align themselves with the Hardliners or Radicals to force the re-
maining members of the autocracy to accept the new political order. Because
the Hardliners control the authoritarian regime￿ s repression apparatus, they
normally make a more attractive partner. As will become apparent from the
discussion below, Hardliner-Reformer-Moderate coalitions were more insti-
tutionally viable in Argentina and Spain than in the Soviet Union because
the Communist Party apparatus did not depend on a co-opted middle class￿ s
cooperation to endure ￿instead every organization relied on the Party. Such
a transition could only take place in the Soviet Union when the Hardliners￿
leader was himself a Reformer. That happened with Gorbachev. In terms
of our model, the exogenous or intrinsic valence of the Hardline leaders of
the regime had become very low indeed in contrast to oppositional reform-
ers. Although Gorbachev could retain power through the support of the
Communist Party elite, when he tried to adopt a Reformer position, moving
nearer the center, he lost to higher valence reformers.
Although Figure 2 is not immediately applicable to the fall of the So-
viet Union, we can note that the control exercised by the CPSU can be
interpreted as a position on the contract curve close to the autocrat posi-
tion. Similarly, the stability of ￿sovereign democracy￿in Russia at present
suggests an equilibrium position for Putin that is characterized by cooper-
ation with, or control over, capital, a high degree of economic inequality,
politically sustained by his high valence in contrast to the valences of the
fragmented opposition.
2 Political Economy Theory
Political economy theory (PET) is based on the postulates of the ￿new in-
stitutionalism￿ , two of which seem of greatest importance. First, political
￿actors take rational actions to maximize the probabilities of re-election, ca-
reer advancement, or some other positive bene￿t.￿ 9 According to Kenneth
Shepsle, ￿a rational agent [or actor] is one who comes to a social situation
with preferences over possible social states, beliefs about the world around
him, and a capability to employ these data intelligently.￿ 10 Douglass North
systematized the second postulate in his inquires into institutional design
and economic performance: ￿Institutions are the rules of the game in a so-
6ciety... the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction...
they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or
economic.￿ 11 PET can illuminate a political system￿ s institutionally engen-
dered incentive structures to determine whether they are more or less likely
to encourage rational agents to behave in ways that render a regime more
susceptible to collapse.
In gauging an authoritarian system￿ s susceptibility to collapse, we ask:
(1) how its fundamental de jure and de facto political institutions provide
incentives to citizens to oust their autocratic elite and
(2) what are the institutionally-induced prospects of successful ouster?
Smith wrote that ￿authoritarian regimes can break down because of
external war, economic crisis, social upheaval, or defections from the ruling
coalition. Pressures can come from without, from within, or from below.￿ 12
We start with the assumption that, in theory, any regime can be dislodged by
a foreign army. This limits the inquiry to the authoritarian elite￿ s power vis-
￿-vis its subjects and cohesion. The case studies were selected partly because
their regimes were not ejected by foreign invasion. It is obvious, however,
that certain authoritarian systems, particularly fascist varieties, rely more
on saber-rattling nationalism to keep the citizenry mobilized behind the
dictator, heightening the chance of war, military defeat, and invasion.
PET identi￿es two sources of political power. To quote Acemoglu, and
Robinson 13 : ￿The ￿rst source of political power is simply what a group
can do to other groups and the society at large by using force. [We] refer to
this as de facto political power.￿De facto political power￿ s distribution is
not static. ￿Harvest failures, economic depressions, international ￿nancial
or debt crises, and wars... are intrinsically transitory and lead to short-
term ￿ uctuations in de facto political power.￿The other source of political
power, ￿allocated by political institutions,￿ is called de jure power. The
literature identi￿es three societal groups who exercise those powers: an elite,
a citizenry, and a middle class. By de￿nition the elites are a minority and the
citizenry the majority. In this body of theory, they have con￿ icting interests.
￿For example, if the elites are the relatively rich individuals... [they] will be
opposed to redistributive taxation; whereas the citizens... will be in favor
of taxation that would redistribute resources to them.￿
As suggested in the introduction, the present study extends this idea and
refers to economic elites and political elites, located in distinct policy spaces.
The economic factor space is a way of presenting the control exercised by
each individual over the relevant factors, and by inference, the individual￿ s
utility funtion. For example, a capitalist (or Capital interest) at C in Figure
1 will be obviously opposed to redistribution of capital wealth, but may
7agree to a redistribution of the factor of land. Capital and the landed
interest may also bargain e⁄ectively to retain their power ( as illustrated by
the example above from Britain in the eighteenth century). An individual
at L, endowed only with labor, would prefer capital, and perhaps land,
redistribution. Similarly, the political axis represents an individual￿ s policy
preferences on the distribution of political rights. Figure 1 suggest that a
capitalist at C may not prefer the extreme concentration of political power
implied by A. Again, holders of the labor factor may be conservative in their
views about the rights to be allocated to minorities, for example. Both the
elite ￿activists￿ , who bargain in the political realm, and the citizenry will
be characterized by the distribution of their preferred points in the political
economic space, W:
In Argentina and Spain, the political and economic elites were allies.
In the Soviet Union, however, because of capital￿ s private ownership￿ s pro-
scription, no traditional economic elite existed. Instead, there was only a
political elite (the CPSU), which collectively managed all Soviet capital. In
some sense, therefore, the political elite was the economic elite ￿however
they only reaped a political reward from it. Between the elite and great mass
of citizens lies the middle class, which often sees itself as a distinct group
with distinct interests and thus a player in the contest for more de jure and
de facto power in order to realize its interests. The economic elite, owning
a disproportionate share of capital, will generally be most redistribution-
averse, while the citizenry will be most in favor of redistribution. The middle
class￿ s capital redistribution preference will generally lie between the elite￿ s
and citizenry￿ s ( represented by the position marked Bourgeois in Figure 1).
The greater the concentration of capital and level of inequality, the fur-
ther will the centrist citizen be from the elite preferred position and the
more redistribution he will prefer. However, one can similarly think of the
distribution of political power. Certain individuals, whether CPSU appa-
ratchiki or Argentine generals, will disproportionately in￿ uence state policy
while others, like non-party members in the USSR or former Republicans in
Francoist Spain, are underrepresented in policy making.
Centrist redistribution explains why elites oppose democracy. ￿Non-
democracy, especially compared to the ideal of democracy, is neither egali-
tarian nor fair. Therefore... citizens have a constant desire to change the
outcome, the policies, and the regime. What prevents them is the fact that
the elites control the political institutions and military power in nondemo-
cratic societies...￿ 14While the citizens lack de jure power in authoritarian
systems, their majority status confers some de facto power, which they can
use to threaten revolution unless the elite promises greater redistribution.
8The elite must always choose an equilibrium, based on cost-bene￿t analysis,
between redistributive concessions and repression to forestall revolution.
Repression is attractive when it is marginally cheaper than concessions.
However, North and Weingast suggest that policy concessions are some-
times insu¢ cient to stave-o⁄ revolution because ￿commitment problems
arise when political power is not in the hands of the bene￿ciaries of the
promised policies. In essence, those with political power cannot commit
not to use it to renege on promises made in the past.￿ 15 To forestall elite
reneging when de facto power￿ s distribution swings back in their favor, the
temporarily empowered citizens regularly demand institutional changes that
transfer some policy-making powers to themselves. While some citizen rev-
olutionaries might call for institutionalizing a dictatorship of the citizenry,
such demands are rare because they give the elite the incentive to spare no
cost to block the citizens￿aims.
The response of the elite on the basis of this cost-bene￿t analysis also bal-
ances the revolutionary threat￿ s credibility against democratization￿ s prob-
able impact on their assets. For the revolutionary threat to be credible,
its leaders must overcome revolution￿ s inherent collective-action problems.
￿...the payo⁄ for not taking part is always greater than the payo⁄ for tak-
ing part in a revolution. Therefore, all citizens prefer to free-ride on others￿
revolutionary activities rather than incurring the costs themselves.￿ 16 Like
the elite, the citizens perform cost-bene￿t analyses to discern whether rev-
olution is pro￿table. ￿The simplest way to think of a post-revolutionary
society is... that some of the resources of the economy are destroyed in the
turbulence of the revolution and the rest are distributed in some way among
the citizens.￿ 17 Some revolutionary leaders successfully impart an ideologi-
cal utility calculus to their followers, so they receive su¢ cient reward from
serving the group. However,
[m]ost real-world revolutionaries try to generate private ben-
e￿ts, monetary or otherwise, for taking part in revolutionary
activities that the participants can keep, even if the revolution
fails... In practice, the most common strategy to deal with col-
lective action problems is ￿ exclusion.￿ Exclusion limits the ben-
e￿ts from collective action to only those who take part in the
action.18
Not only the citizens are divided, di⁄erent members of the elite have
di⁄erent interests, re￿ ecting the nature of their economic resources.
Turbulence and disruption lead to the breakdown of complex
9economic relations... much more important for capitalist pro-
duction than agrarian production. This is natural because there
is less concern about the quality of products in agriculture than
in manufacturing. Moreover, the importance of complex rela-
tionships between buyer and supplier networks, and of invest-
ments in skills and in relationship-speci￿c capital, is far greater
in more industrialized activities.19
Therefore, repression and revolution￿ s disorder is marginally more costly
for industrialists than for landowners, making industrialists marginally more
congenial to granting violence-averting concessions. ￿Because land is sup-
plied more inelastically, when allowed, citizens impose higher taxes on land
than on capital.￿ 20 This further widens the di⁄erence between industrial-
ists￿and landowners￿marginal willingness to repress. Likewise, political
elites whose power relies more on autonomous organizations, like economic
elites and independent technocrats, risk losing more from repression that
breaks down complex political networks and alliances.
Usually, a middle class is an independent political actor in the haggle
between the elites and the citizens over the extent of enfranchisement. The
middle class￿ s greater income endowment positions it as the citizenry￿ s nat-
ural vanguard. However, that greater income endowment simultaneously
makes them less inclined towards resource redistribution than the citizenry.
Indeed, the elite may enfranchise, and thus co-opt, the middle class if it
calculates that the economic cost of the consequent redistribution regime,
induced by the new poorer centrist voter, is less than that of repressing an
alliance of middle class and citizenry. ￿A large a› uent middle class may act
like a bu⁄er between the elites and the citizens in democracy. It does this
by simultaneously making democratization more attractive for elites than
repression and changing policy enough that the citizens are content not to
revolt.￿ 21
In this paper, the idea of a middle class is important in both an economic
and political context. It indicates that certain economic and political groups
are able and willing to align themselves with either pole of the economic
and/or political axis. When centrist groups have a lot of latitude, they decide
whether the authoritarian regime remains intact or liberalizes. Therefore,
when the middle class or part of the middle class has been co-opted to keep
the authoritarian regime a￿ oat, the authoritarian regime￿ s survival depends
on the cohesiveness of the alliance of the elite and middle classes. In terms
of the model illustrated by Figure 2, the stronger the bourgeois, the closer
will be the regime￿ s balance locus to the mean of the selectorate.
10The second element of an authoritarian regime￿ s durability is its elite￿ s
cohesiveness. Smith delineates two types of authoritarian elites, ￿personalis-
tic and institutional... personalistic dictatorships are ruled by strong-willed
individuals who dominate the political process. Their principal interest is
power. They are tyrants. They do not subscribe to substantive ideologies
and they do not have programmatic missions.￿ 22 Obvious examples are Tru-
jillo￿ s Dominican Republic and Duvalier￿ s Haiti. Basically, the political elite
of a personalistic regime is the tyrant and his coterie. ￿Institutional author-
itarian regimes [are] very di⁄erent. Power [does] not belong to individuals.
It belongs to committees, bureaucracies, or institutions.￿ 23 The juntas of
Argentina and Brazil belong to this category. Obviously, this measure is rel-
ative. Even personalistic dictatorships have delegated some administrative,
and thus some de facto, power to bureaucracies.
Smith contends that
There are two broad types of change: transition via ruptura, a
complete and usually sudden and violent break with the authori-
tarian past and transition via reforma, a process of give-and-take
negotiation between incumbents and dissidents... gradual and
pragmatic changes via ￿ reforma￿tend to be incremental, not rev-
olutionary, and include formal or informal compacts designed to
achieve political transformation with a minimum of risks.24
Smith illustrates the incentives for citizens to revolt and elites to hold
tenaciously to power in order to uncover when transitions either via ruptura
or via reforma are more likely. He concludes,
Personalistic regimes have been most susceptible to sweeping
and violent overthrow... Dissidents usually believed it was nec-
essary to eliminate the tyrant via assassination and that with
this accomplishment the entire regime would crumble. There
was neither room nor need for negotiations with surviving col-
laborators: without the dictator they had no remaining power
base... In dominant-party regimes, as in Mexico, members of the
erstwhile ruling party could simply move into the opposition...
Military regimes also [have] a ready exit: they [can] return to
the barracks... More than any other autocrats, military rulers
[have] a place to go. This often [makes] it easier for them to
engage in negotiations with the opposition.25
11Smith￿ s distinction between ￿ personalistic￿and ￿ institutional￿dictator-
ships is similar to Machiavelli￿ s distinction between absolute princes (per-
sonal dictators who face no real organized opposition) and limited princes
(limited by institutions which give some others substantial power to oppose
the autocratic leader). Machiavelli argued that absolute princes are more
di¢ cult to bring down and violence is probably needed to do so, but once
the old regime is upset, the new prince/dictator can maintain his power
relatively easily, with the implication that this kind of regime is relatively
durable until the next round of violence occurs. On the other hand, Machi-
avelli claimed that limited princes are easier to bring down because their
various opponents can be attracted into a revolutionary coalition by the
promise of more power and other bene￿ts, yet the new autocratic leaders
will have a relatively di¢ cult time maintaining power for the same reason.
Some of Machiavelli￿ s observations can be related to the idea of valence.
An absolute prince may well be strongly loved by the majority, though
hated by a minority of the citizenry. Indeed, successful imperial houses
can be long -lived precisely because they surround the prince with pomp
and circumstance, raising the intrinsic valence, just as it may be raised by
media attention in a modern democracy. Limited princes may face much
less variance in the valence by which they are perceived by the citizens.
With this background on political economic theory, we can now proceed
to our case studies.
3 Case Studies
3.1 Argentine Junta (1976-1983)
O￿ Donnell (1978) de￿nes bureaucratic authoritarianism as ￿a system of ex-
clusion of the popular sector, based on the reaction of dominant sectors and
classes to the political and economic crises to which populism and its de-
velopmentalist successors led.￿ 26 In the 1960s and 1970s, Latin American
militaries adopted such systems in Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. How-
ever, unlike earlier exclusions of the popular sector, the military ruled both
directly and collegially, not simply supporting economic elites￿hegemony.
Argentina￿ s 1976-83 experience is paradigmatic.
After the coup of the March 24, 1976, the Argentine military reorganized
the government so that the military command selected the president and
cabinet, both of whom, acting together, made and executed all laws.27 The
president derived little power from his title and policy decisions required
some consensus among military notables.
12Each service had its ￿ feudal domains￿and active duty o¢ -
cers were appointed to a much wider range of subordinate posts,
as commanders of the federal police, intervenors of the central
labor federation and key unions, and heads of the major state
enterprises. Military control, furthermore, also penetrated the
provincial level, dividing governorships between the branches,
and at times reached all the way down to local government.28
There was no umpire who could utilize referee powers to impose stabil-
ity and mitigate factional acrimony. Thus government decisions re￿ ected
the policy preferences of those o¢ cers possessing the most de facto power.
Wynia (1986) described the junta￿ s governing operation as
[n]ever very neat, no matter how hard the junta work[ed] to
appear united behind the president... [and grew] worse when
commands [were] rotated... New service commanders [did] not
necessarily come from the same factions as those who originally
appointed the president, which, when ignored, [could] escalate
into agitation for his replacement.29
By the time the military installed its ￿rst president, General Jorge
Videla, the junta had already split into three factions on issues of the longer-
term political future. One, headed by Admiral Emilio Messera, wanted
to cow the hitherto combative working class by mimicking Peronist pop-
ulism, but trading economic nationalist rhetoric for anti-Marxist rhetoric
and, as e⁄ective counterinsurgency and anti-subversive campaigns subsided,
reasserting old irredentist claims.30 The second faction, headed by Gener-
als Carlos Mas￿n and Mario MenØndez, favored unrelenting war against
everything Peronist and leftist and completely replacing Argentina￿ s protec-
tionist trade policy and bloated public sector with market fundamentalism.
The third clique, led by General Videla and his successor, General Roberto
Viola, wanted economic recovery. Although they deemed greater reliance
on markets as a wise recovery tactic, they did not sanction fundamentally
dismantling all state enterprises and even reversed some early trade liberal-
ization policies to aid the industrialist elite at the agrarian elite￿ s expense.31
In October 1979, MenØndez launched a rebellion against what he saw as too
moderate a regime. Videla and Viola￿ s military allies squelched the insurrec-
tion but, in 1981, the harder-line General Leopoldo Galtieri obtained enough
support within the military to threaten a coup against Viola. Politically
weakened by economic crisis and perceived softness on the left, attributable
13to his releasing Isabel Peron from government custody, Viola resigned and
Galtieri replaced him.32
After the 1976 coup, Videla ￿went to work right away, unleashing the
three [military] services￿intelligence and counterinsurgency units to make
war on the clandestine military movements whose members had been ter-
rorizing the country with kidnappings and bombings for over three years.￿ 33
The guerillas
[s]ought the violent overthrow of the government and the
institution of a revolutionary socialist regime along Marxist-
Leninist lines. They were predominantly middle class and many
were university students or recent graduates. [They were] des-
perately idealistic and deeply alienated by the merry-go-round
of Argentine politics.34
Videla gave military intelligence and counterinsurgency units wide lati-
tude to arrest, interrogate, and kill virtually autonomously. Many who never
committed terrorist acts
[l]ived in fear, never knowing whether or not they, too, might
be taken away from their homes in one of the government￿ s in-
famous, unmarked gray Ford Falcons, never to be seen again.
Suspects were taken to one of 280 clandestine prisons, most of
them on military bases in or near the nation￿ s largest cities,
where they were tortured and killed without any records of their
deaths being kept.35
Between 10,000 and 20,000 ￿disappeared￿ that way in what is called
Argentina￿ s Dirty War.36
Like many other Latin American countries, an economically liberal agrar-
ian oligarchy dominated Argentina until the Great Depression-induced con-
traction of foreign demand for Argentine agricultural goods spurred limited
industrialization to provide no longer importable consumer goods. Peron ac-
celerated industrialization during his Presidency (1946-55), imposing heavy
tari⁄s on foreign manufactured goods and overvaluing the exchange rate to
encourage capital goods￿importation.37￿In spite of the liberal restoration
in 1955, the agricultural capitalists never regained full political power, and
they became even more economically marginalized in the expansive indus-
trialization of the 1960s.￿ 38 Peron￿ s bloc included the industrial elite, urban
middle class, and working class. However, between 1955 and Peronism￿ s
141973 resuscitation, foreign direct investment generated substantial capital
accumulation and growth of the industrial elite and urban bourgeoisie, un-
dermining their political alliance with the working class and increasing the
number of interests they shared with the residual agrarian elite.
In 1975, many labor ￿unions began negotiating new contracts with 100
percent wage increases or more.￿ 39 The Peronist government annulled the
new contracts, inciting massive strikes, forcing the government to reinstate
them. Concurrently, in￿ ation reached 335 percent and Marxist guerillas
staged provocative attacks on the police and military, assassinating some
bigwigs.40 The military cunningly waited to overthrow Isabel Peron until
she thoroughly discredited her regime. Peronism failed
[d]ue in large measure to the loss of control by the trade
union bureaucracy over the working class... Finally the deepen-
ing economic crisis made it imperative to the bourgeoisie to move
toward a ￿ strong state￿that could suppress the living standards
of the masses su¢ ciently to restore a ￿ healthy￿rate of pro￿t for
capitalism.41
Argentina￿ s economic evolution sundered the industrial elite￿ s and ur-
ban bourgeoisie￿ s Peronist political alliance with the working class and the
1970s ￿economic situation deprived the bourgeoisie of the maneuvering room
needed to grant reforms to the workers without threatening the pro￿tabil-
ity of industry.￿ 42 Genuinely socialist labor organizations, out￿ anking the
o¢ cial unions and coordinating o¢ cially unsanctioned strikes and other col-
lective action, drove the middle class into the military￿ s lap.
The military needed extensive elite and middle class support because
of the military establishment￿ s limited expertise. Not only did they need
technocrats to formulate macroeconomic policy, they needed the elite￿ s and
middle class￿ s acquiescence to implement the policy. The Argentine junta￿ s
key economic initiatives were:
(1) The reduction of real wages by nearly 50 percent in re-
lation to the previous ￿ve years, increase in the price of public
services, and an end to the subsidy of social services such as
health and housing
(2) A program of progressive reduction of import tari⁄s, no
subsidies to nontraditional exports, encouragement of agricul-
tural exports
(3) A liberalization of the exchange and ￿nancial markets
15(4) The reduction of government expenditure and employ-
ment, and the reprivatization of state owned ￿rms.43
The junta￿ s policies contributed to a ￿ ood of foreign capital, which
started when OPEC￿ s 1973-4 and 1979-81 production halts provided OPEC
countries￿governments with so many dollars they could not invest them all
domestically. The OPEC governments deposited huge sums in American
and European banks, lowering interest rates and enticing Latin American
borrowers. ￿Between 1976 and 1980 the [Argentine] ￿nancial sector grew
by 45 percent. Finance capital, a fusion of banking and capital, became the
hegemonic [faction] within the ruling class [bloc].￿ 44 The new preponderant
elite faction soon faced calamity and grew disenchanted with their military
partners, no longer trusting them to steward the economy.
In the early 1980s, First World recession depressed demand for Latin
America￿ s raw materials and Argentina￿ s obsession with comparative ad-
vantage pushed many industrialists into bankruptcy, making raw materials
a very high percentage of exports. At the same time, international inter-
est rates rose markedly, stretching Latin American borrowers to the limit.
After Mexico defaulted on its foreign loans, the supply of loanable funds
to all Latin American countries plummeted. Unable to continue pro￿ igate
de￿cit spending, capital ￿ owed out of Argentina to its creditor nations.
The Argentine ￿nancial elite, with bank failure spreading like wild ￿re, lost
all con￿dence in the junta. Simultaneously, skyrocketing unemployment
and poverty triggered citizen demands for regime change, and increased the
popularity of a Reformer-Moderate regime. Scho￿eld and Cataife (2007)
discuss the electoral changes in support of Carlos Menem, the candiate of
the Partido Justicialista in winning the election of 1989. It is of interest
that Menem won the second election in 1995 by instuting the Convertability
Plan to tie the peso to the dollar. This generated signi￿cant bene￿ts for
the bourgeois and capitalists, at signi￿cant cost to the working class. In
terms of the model deployed here, Menem won the 1989 election because of
his high intrinsic valence, and then capitalized on activist support to move
further away from the electoral center.
3.2 Francoist Spain (1938-1975)
No universally accepted de￿nition of fascism exists. In fact, the word fascist
is used frequently simply as a pejorative to denigrate regimes resembling
those most associated with fascism ￿Nazi Germany and Mussolini￿ s Italy.
Seymour Martin Lipset claims that ￿mainstream fascism of the Mussolini
16and Hitler variety sprang from the same secular, petit bourgeois sources
as classical liberalism.￿Lipset sees such ￿mainstream fascism￿as ￿a move-
ment of the center... a reaction of the lower middle-class that, frightened by
communism, had lost its faith in democracy.￿Moreover, Lipset divided that
movement into a right-wing, ￿violent reactionaries who use extremist tactics
and modern mobilization techniques to defend traditional cultural values,￿
and a left-wing, ￿anti-democratic anti-Marxist movements that compete
with communists for working class support.￿ 45 He would include Portugal￿ s
Salazar and Austria￿ s Dolfuss in the former group and Argentina￿ s Peron
and Brazil￿ s Vargas in the latter.
Payne (1995) typi￿es fascist movements￿ideology as an ￿espousal of an
idealist, vitalist, and voluntaristic philosophy, normally involving the at-
tempt to realize a new modern, self-determined, and secular culture￿and
their goals as creating a novel nationalist authoritarian state with an impe-
rialist or assertive foreign policy.46 He depicts them as anti-liberal, anti-
communist, and, although they may temporarily ally with conservative
groups out of expediency, anti-conservative. Their anti-conservatism stems
from their desire to transform modern society radically through society￿ s mil-
itarization, emphasizing emotions and mysticism, and exalting youth over
other stages of life.47 However, Payne concedes that his typology is only a
base and that many fascist movements add additional unique elements or
do not meet a few of his criteria but are still fascist. He attributes some of
the variety to fascism￿ s intrinsic nationalism, which is expressed di⁄erently
in countries with di⁄erent histories and cultures.48 Payne argues ￿all fascist
movements generally... subordinated economic issues to the state and to
the greater well-being of the nation, while retaining the basic principle of
private property...[and] most fascist movements espoused corporatism.￿ 49
Politically, he notes ￿a general tendency to exalt leadership, hierarchy...
[and] deferring to the creative function of leadership more than to prior
ideology or a bureaucratized party line.￿ 50
Spain￿ s fascist movement did not enjoy the degree of support accorded
fascist parties in the other European countries in the early 1930s. Previously
a marginal political group, even on the right, the fascist corporatist Falange,
founded and charismatically led by JosØ Antonio Primo de Rivera, the de-
posed General Rivera￿ s son, gained prominence after the electoral failure of
the less radical right in 1936. The country￿ s subsequent lurch to the left
discredited politicians committed to democratically.implementing a rightist
agenda.. Falangist ideology ￿identi￿ed the age of Spain￿ s greatness as the
15th century, the heyday of Castilian centralism￿and melded imperialism,
devout Catholicism, the adulation of military values, and ￿vague promises
17to ￿ redeem￿the working and peasant classes￿ 51 and urged the violent seizure
of power.
Even with mainstream rightist parties￿discredited, the Falange was too
impotent to consider independently toppling the Republic. When the Civil
War erupted, Republican forces arrested most Falangist leaders, weakening
the movement even more. The weakened Falange joined the Nationalist
movement and integrated its militias into the Nationalist army, thereby sur-
rendering its autonomy to Franco. On April 18, 1937, Franco uni￿ed, by
decree, all rightist organizations. (The new organization ￿called Falange
Espanola Tradicionalista y de las JONS ￿was more ideologically, symbol-
ically, and organizationally Falangist than anything else.) He assumed the
conglomerate￿ s leadership, and outlawed all other political organizations.
Franco forced uni￿cation with carrots and sticks. He jailed rightist leaders
who opposed his takeover but simultaneously gave each faction powers. Most
rightists agreed to unite, even if dissatis￿ed with their role in the Nation-
alist organization, because the Republicans were still formidable and many,
particularly the Falangists, never realistically believed they would have as
much power as they then held. They did not want to risk losing it in the
pursuit of complete power and ideological purity.52 Despite Franco￿ s over-
lordship and need to share power with other rightist groups, the Falange set
the ideological tone and ran the corporatist trade syndicates until the end
of the Second World War.
The de jure political institutions of Francoist Spain developed during
the Civil War. After the Civil War￿ s eruption, an imprecisely de￿ned de-
centralized Junta of National Defense, under General Miguel Cabanellas￿ s
nominal leadership, directed the Nationalist Army, while General Emilio
Molo commanded Carlist forces53, and the Falangist militias and other anti-
Republican forces fought for the most part independently.54 On August 6,
1936, Franco ￿ ew to Seville to set up his headquarters. ￿By mid-August, it
had already become clear that the key to [a Nationalist] victory lay in the
tough and disciplined Army of Africa, which Franco himself had done so
much to create in his brilliant military youth...And since Franco controlled
this impressive weapon, he was already[,] in fact if not in name, the Supreme
Commander.￿ 55
On September 12, 1936, to foster greater tactical unity, ten Nationalist
generals and two colonels met outside Salamanca to resolve whether there
should be a uni￿ed Nationalist command. All present but Cabanellas sup-
ported anointing Franco Generalissimo of the Nationalist forces but to keep
the decision secret until the National Defense Junta at Burgos could meet
and make the public announcement.56 They then scheduled a further meet-
18ing to specify the Generalissimo￿ s powers and appoint a Chief of State. The
group reconvened on September 29 and, after heated debate, voted on a
compromise decree, which Cabanellas signed as Chairman of the National
Defense Committee at Burgos. The decree stated,
His Excellency Don Francisco Franco Bahamonde has been
appointed Head of the Government of the Spanish State and will
assume all the powers of the New State. He is likewise appointed
Generalissimo of the National Land, Sea, and Air Forces, and
the post of Chief General of the Operational Armies is conferred
upon him.57
Cabanellas ceremoniously bestowed these powers on Franco on Octo-
ber 1. If the decree did not speci￿cally grant Franco dictatorial powers,
he immediately assumed them and commenced issuing decrees as Chief of
State. With the Nationalist military victory, every semblance of democracy
disappeared. Franco manufactured an irrelevant unicameral Cortes.
One third of the members were directly nominated by the
Generalissimo. A further third were ex o¢ cio members ￿govern-
ment ministers, members of the Consejo Nacional, the President
of the Supreme Court, the Alcaldes of the ￿fty provincial capi-
tals, rectors of universities and so on ￿all of whom had also been
nominated to their posts by Franco or his ministers. Finally, the
remaining third were ￿ elected by the Falangist syndicates from
carefully prepared lists of candidates... Although the ￿ represen-
tative￿elements would be widened over the years, the Cortes
met very rarely and always approved legislation submitted to it.
Ministers were responsible to the Caudillo, not to the Cortes.58
The Council of Ministers became the only consequential policy-making
body.
Franco established a Council of Ministers on January 30, 1938, with
himself as its President, and appointed eleven ministers the following day.
Franco ￿appointed and dismissed [ministers] at will, and could dictate and
promulgate laws without previously consulting them. Franco laid down the
general guidelines of policy... So long as his ministers stayed within his
guidelines they had considerable latitude in running their departments.￿ 59
The Council normally held all-day sessions weekly or biweekly.
19In the regime￿ s early years Franco tended to dominate the
discussions, but later he preferred to encourage debate among
others while he listened. When he thought the matter had been
discussed su¢ ciently he would call for a resolution. If there was
general agreement, the resolution was passed; if not, the minis-
ters were told to study the matter further and try to come to a
consensus before the next meeting.60
Franco focused on foreign policy, clerical matters, and public order is-
sues and left what he considered mundane administration to his cabinet.61
His power hinged on preserving right-wing unity but not allowing any sin-
gle Nationalist faction from dominating the rest, which would have nec-
essarily sidelined Franco. From the cabinet￿ s opening to Franco￿ s death,
three factions (the Alphonsist monarchists62, Carlist monarchists, and the
Falangists) constantly jockeyed for dominant in￿ uence. Each faction had a
following in the military and broader Nationalist network and Franco￿ s per-
sonal control stemmed from his referee position. As ostensibly impartial as
possible, Franco played a shrewd political balancing game, appointing min-
isters, who he thought amenable to his will, from each Nationalist faction
and the military. He subtly encouraged factional competition for ministries
but cultivated enough unity to ovoid a Nationalist coalitional fracture that
might draw some leftist groups back into politics.
Franco fostered factional competition and managed to prevent the for-
mation of power centers through frequent cabinet shakeups, thirteen in all.63
Franco￿ s ￿rst cabinet included ￿ve Alphonsists, one Carlist, three Falangists,
and two military o¢ cers. Despite their political strength, radical Falangists
could not overcome Franco￿ s regime of compromise. Indeed, some of them
planned a coup. Franco responded with another cabinet shakeup, appoint-
ing more Falangists to the cabinet but more moderate ones loyal to himself,
and stationing potential coup plotters in prestigious but innocuous govern-
ment posts, such as the ambassadorship to Brazil.64 To di⁄use power further,
Franco trifurcated the military command, creating a ministry for each mil-
itary branch and handing them to di⁄erent Nationalist factions.65Until the
Axis￿ s defeat became apparent, Franco devoted most energy attending to the
Falangist-Monarchist and Military cleavage and sidelining Falangist radicals
vitalized by Hitler￿ s early military successes. However, after World War II,
the Falangists lost their initiative and Franco subordinated them.
Facing critics at home and abroad in the wake of the Second World War,
Franco composed a Spanish bill of rights to temper their censure and ob-
fuscate his recent amity with Hitler and Mussolini. The bill of rights, the
20Charter of the Spaniards (Fuero de los Espaæoles), dated July 16, 1945 and
released the next day, did not really change the contours of power. While
proclaiming ￿respect for the dignity[;] integrity and liberty of the human per-
son,￿enshrining freedom from arbitrary arrest, and guaranteeing the right
to education; work; security in distress; and the inviolability of property, it
stated that Spaniards owed loyalty to the Chief of State. Moreover, many
rights were abrogated as quickly as they were given. Article 12 read, ￿All
Spaniards may freely express their ideas, so long as these do not prejudice
the fundamental principles of the State,￿and Article 16 read, ￿Spaniards
may assemble and associate freely for lawful purposes and in accordance
with the law.￿ 66 Although the rights enumerated in Fuero de los Espaæoles
were picayune to start, the charter lacked internal provisions for ensuring the
rights￿protection. Article 34 deputized the Franco-appointed Cortes to pass
necessary legislation to protect the rights speci￿ed in the Charter. However,
the Cortes passed few laws translating Charter-guaranteed rights into state
commitments. Furthermore, Article 35 allowed the government to ￿tem-
porarily￿suspend certain articles detailing citizens￿individual rights.67The
Fuero de los Espaæoles also proclaimed Spain a monarchy, although Franco
did not identify its monarch.
As Franco aged, internal pressures mounted to name a successor. That
Spain would revert to monarchy after Franco￿ s death was assured but nobody
knew whom Franco would choose as king. Alfonso XIII￿ s son, Juan de Bor-
b￿n, and grandson, Juan Carlos, appealed to Alfonsists, but Franco could
not jilt his arch-conservative Carlist allies. Franco thought Juan de Borb￿n
too liberal to meet both his standard. Consequently, Franco passed him over
for his Francoist Spanish-educated son, Juan Carlos, whom Franco thought
would oversee Francoist absolutism￿ s continuation after proper grooming.68
On July 21, 1969, Franco informed the Council of the Realm69 and Cortes
that he had named Juan Carlos his successor. The Council of the Realm
immediately approved the decision and the Cortes joined them the next
day. Upon installation as heir-apparent, Juan Carlos began o¢ ciating at
state events along with Franco and showed no inclination toward democ-
racy. Although, nearer to Franco￿ s death, Juan Carlos met with some exiled
opposition leaders, Franco dismissed any possibility that Juan Carlos might
betray Francoist political principles.
Descending into dotage and the in￿rmity of Parkinson￿ s disease , Franco
appointed Secretary to the President Admiral Carrero Blanco as vice-President
of the Council of Ministers, with the responsibility of supervising the cabi-
net￿ s daily activities. On July 9, 1973, Franco ￿resigned as president of the
Council of Ministers and turned the job over to Admiral Carrero Blanco...
21[Franco remained] Chief of State, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,
and Caudillo of the National Movement, but for the most part he [became]
just a ￿gure head.￿ 70
Spain rapidly industrialized in the ￿rst quarter of twentieth century, with
over half of the 1929 population employed in industry or the service sector,
producing a large proletariat and severe urban wealth inequalities. Concur-
rently, on the Mediterranean coast, an agrarian elite owned large estates on
which masses of rural laborers cultivated valuable exports, including wine,
fruit and nuts (for a pittance.).71The urban and rural wealth inequalities
spawned outspoken socialist groups calling for wealth redistribution. Royal
governments and General Primo de Rivera (dictator 1923-30) vacillated be-
tween repression and concessions to the citizenry, but no policy secured
enough support to produce a stable coalition of societal actors. The left
dominated the ￿rst Republican government and instituted stridently pro-
labor policies: ￿an eight-hour working day, compulsory wage arbitration,
security of tenure for leaseholders and sharecroppers, and agrarian reform
to redistribute the large estates.￿ 72 Though unbridled labor assertiveness
and socialist fractiousness handed the 1933 election to a right-wing coali-
tion, a reunited and revitalized left recaptured power in 1936 and applied
redistributive policies even more forcefully than before, rallying the eco-
nomic elite and even most of the middle class behind the Nationalists when
the coup came.
While Spain￿ s economic elites favored Franco over the Republican so-
cialists and communists, the Nationalists were not wedded to big business￿ s
interests. Equating free markets with individualism and destabilizing class
warfare, Franco and other Nationalists, bent on consolidating their power,
resorted to a limited corporatist command economy.
The economy was to be run, literally, on military lines; ob-
jectives were to be identi￿ed and the necessary factors of pro-
duction brought together... economic policy before and after
the war was placed largely in the hands of the military. At
all levels of economic policy-making and implementation men in
uniform abounded... a bewildering array of bodies at national
and provincial levels [were] created to supervise every aspect of
economic life.73
However, the Nationalists returned assets expropriated by the Republi-
cans when they could and imposed an exceedingly pro-elite labor policy.
Franco￿ s labor policy smashed independent trade unions and labor par-
ties and replaced them with o¢ cial Falangist syndicates for each trade.
22With everyone engaged in each area of the economy enrolled
in a syndicate, representatives from both the employers and the
employed were supposed to act together to ensure harmonious
labor relations. In practice, while all workers were dragooned
into the syndicates, employers successfully demanded exemption
and the o¢ cial organizations became devices for disciplining the
labor force. With strikes and collective bargaining outlawed, the
syndicates controlled employment, and set wages and conditions
of work. Not surprisingly, it was the interests of employers that
were mainly favored.74
Although the syndicates were Falange appendages, the cabinet set eco-
nomic policy.
Government controls spurred economic ine¢ ciencies and a signi￿cant
black market. The economy stagnated and the economic and political au-
thoritarian elites accrued disproportionately large percentages of the formal
and black market economies￿surplus. By the 1950s, the citizenry￿ s economic
position grew so bad that anti-regime protests and strikes erupted and nu-
merous Falangist syndicate leaders joined them, reasoning that only more
balanced syndicate employer-employee mediation, not repression, could avert
disruptive revolutionary activity. Realizing many of his economic elite al-
lies would open political transition negotiations with oppositional moderates
should he violently repress the anti-regime protestors and keep the status
quo, Franco responded with a cabinet reshu› e. In 1957, Franco introduced
another faction to the authoritarian elite, thee Opus Dei -a¢ liated, neolib-
eral, professionally trained economists. The technocrats liberalized trade,
reduced in￿ ation, raised interest rates, curtailed public spending, and liber-
alized capital markets. However, onerous labor regulations remained, as did
extra-Falange labor organization￿ s proscription.75
Spain￿ s neo-liberal program bene￿ted physical capital and banking inter-
ests more than landowning and the economic elite quickly transformed into
a primarily capitalist one. Simultaneously, Spain￿ s stellar GDP growth, av-
eraging 7.5% per annum from 1960 to 1973, manifested itself in a large new
middle class of professionals and white-collar employees. Franco co-opted
the new middle class through its very creation and retained their support
with continued low taxes and career preferment.76Yet, as is so often the case
with economic liberalization, wealth inequality grew and the working class
and the informal sector bore the brunt. The inequality spurred calls for
regime change and a new workers￿movement organization. While Francoist
Hardliners wanted to crush all dissent, the new economic elite and middle
23class had little stomach for it and preferred secret negotiations with non-
Falange union leaders rather than repression (since this would surely lower
industrial productivity). When OPEC reduced petroleum exports, raising
petroleum prices and stimulating extensive in￿ ation, Spain￿ s trade declined,
unemployment surged, and living standards eroded.
The paralysis of the regime in the face of these deep economic
problems helped convince its own chief supporters that the dic-
tatorship was now an obstacle rather than an aid to the pursuit
of their interests. With strikes growing in their intensity and
overt political purpose, employers abandoned the o¢ cial syndi-
cal apparatus to deal directly with the ￿ illegal￿unions.77
The neoliberal program intended to secure fascist longevity divided the
economic elite from their political allies and precipitated a negotiated transi-
tion to democracy in the manner discussed by Przeworski. Brie￿ y, in terms
of the model, the crisis induced a collapse of the valence of the regime, so
that elite support was no longer su¢ cient to retain power.
3.3 The Soviet System (1924-1991)
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) dominated the Soviet
polity. The rigidly hierarchical CPSU concentrated authority in the hands
of the General Secretary (Gensek) of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
While Stalin forged the Gensek dictatorship, which lasted until Glasnost, the
CPSU￿ s hierarchical organizational structure emanated from Lenin￿ s notion
of democratic centralism. Party statutes stated:
The guiding principle of party organizational structure is de-
mocratic centralism, which means:
a. Election of all leading party organs from the lowest to
the highest organ.
b. Periodic accountability of party organs to their party
organizations and higher organs.
c. Strict party discipline and subordination of the minor-
ity to the majority.
d. The decisions of the higher organs are absolutely bind-
ing on lower organs.78
The emphasis of democratic centralism￿ s on electing party leaders from
the bottom up just feigned accountability of top party organs to their sub-
ordinate organs. The Gensek and Secretariat party apparatus determined
24who was on the party election ballots. Democratic centralism-imposed fealty
to majority decisions resulted in the unquestioned obedience to resolutions
passed by Gensek approved party assemblies.
Democratic centralism translated into a branched political hierarchy,
founded on the primary party organization (PPO). As the basic unit of party
organization, PPOs were formed in any Soviet institution or enterprise con-
taining at least three party members. They were ￿found in factories, farms,
schools, universities, research institutes, stores, cultural institutions, gov-
ernment bureaus and o¢ ces, armed forces and police units.￿ 79PPOs imple-
mented party policies and decisions in the institution in which they were em-
bedded. In addition to producing propaganda, organizing workers to meet
party economic plans, striving to strengthen labor discipline, and strug-
gling to improve production standards, PPOs were to ￿promptly inform
the party organs of any shortcomings in the work of the establishment or
individual workers, regardless of their positions.￿ 80Thus, party loyalists in-
￿ltrated every Soviet organization. PPO members usually did not directly
manage PPO activities but elected local party committees, which acted for
the PPOs when they were not in session. The committees then elected local
party secretaries, who handled the PPOs￿day-to-day work.
Above the PPOs, all CPSU units were territorially-based81 and super-
vised all party activities in their territories. Each territorial tier of party
organization consisted of ￿ve organs: (1) the constituent body, ￿the highest
governing organ of party organization,￿which elected from among its mem-
bers the next highest constituent body in the party￿ s territorial hierarchy, a
committee to exercise power during the constituent bodies￿recess, and an
inconsequential auditing commission; (2) a committee, which elected from
among its members an executive decision-making bureau to govern when the
committee was not in session and the territory￿ s party secretaries; (3) the
aforementioned decision-making bureau; (4) a secretariat, consisting of sev-
eral secretaries (including a First and Second secretary at higher levels) and
their sta⁄s to handle the party￿ s day-to-day work for the territorial unit; (5)
an auditing commission, which inspected the work of the party organization
itself.
The CPSU￿ s All-Union constituent body was the Party Congress, elected
by the Party Congresses of the 14 non-Russian Republics and the Party
Conferences of the krays and oblasts. The Party Congress￿ s formal authority
remained relatively static throughout the Soviet years.
The Congress: (a) hear[d] and approve[d] the reports of the
Central Committee, the Central Auditing Commission, and other
25central organizations;
(b) review[d], amend[ed], and approve[d] the party program
and statutes;
(c) determine[d] the party line on questions of domestic and
foreign policy and examine[d] and decide[d] on the most impor-
tant problems in the building of Communism;
(d) elect[ed] the Central Committee and the Central Auditing
Commission.82
However, the Party Congress￿ s infrequent convention83 and unanimous
decisions on proposals o⁄ered by the All-Union Central Committee84 gives
evidence that it was little more than a sounding board for Central Com-
mittee, Politburo, and Secretariat initiatives. The Central Committee set
the Congress￿ s agenda. The Congress listened to the Central Committee￿ s
foreign a⁄airs, domestic a⁄airs, and party a⁄airs report, approved all acts in-
troduced by the leadership and Central Committee resolutions promulgated
since the last Party Congress; and elected a new Central Committee.
The Central Committee was a convention of the party elite. It made the
fateful decision of October 10, 1917 to seize power and initially served as the
Soviet Union￿ s de facto parliament. In the Lenin and early Stalin years, it
contained representatives of the party￿ s important pre-revolutionary factions
and entrenched interests. However, following the revolution, it mainly rub-
berstamped Politburo and Secretariat decisions. That is not to say that the
Politburo members and General Secretary disregarded the Central Commit-
tee members. Responsible for implementing party policy in their localities
and state institutions, Central Committee members wielded some power and
collectively held a common interest in preserving their privileges. Although
Stalin broke their autonomy after murdering a majority of its members in
the 1930s, by the 1960s and until Glasnost, the Soviet system granted ￿un-
precedented personal security and stability of tenure￿for Central Commit-
tee members.85In addition to full voting members, Party Congresses elected
candidate members to the Central Committee, who participated in deliber-
ations and ￿lled vacancies in the Central Committee caused by expulsion,
resignation, or death.86Like the Party Congress, the Central Committee￿ s
size increased and it also met intermittently, twice a year, for a few days
each time. Consequently, the Central Committee became nearly as ponder-
ous as the Party Congresses. To make policy in its absence, the Central
Committee created three bodies to articulate party policy and manage the
party between Central Committee sessions: the Political Bureau (Politburo),
Organizational Bureau (Orgburo, which was merged with the Politburo in
261952), and Secretariat.
The Politburo started as the party￿ s most important decision-making
organ. Since PPOs were embedded in every important enterprise and most
government employees and civil servants were party members, democratic
centralism made Politburo directives the ultimate authority. But soon af-
ter Lenin died, the Secretariat subordinated it. In 1925, General Secretary
Stalin and the General Department of the Secretariat commenced drafting
the Politburo meetings￿agendas.87￿Many draft decisions were prepared in
the Secretariat under the supervision of the Secretary-General and the other
secretaries, and discussed in a secretaries￿meeting before they reached the
Politburo agenda.￿ 88Often, Politburo meetings consisted solely of con￿rm-
ing the Secretariat authored agenda, a process facilitated by the Secretary
General presiding over Politburo meetings.89The Politburo could confer as-
sent through majority vote in sessions or by initialing circulated proposals,
which were raised in the next meeting if they did not garner unanimous
support. However, when Stalin or successive Genseks approached Politburo
members individually with proposals already initialed by the Gensek him-
self, few refused to cosign it. Like the Central Committee, the Politburo
had full voting and candidate members.
The Secretariat supervised the implementation of party policies in ad-
ministrative, economic, military, social, cultural, and professional institu-
tions, organizations, and establishments. The All-Union Secretariat imple-
mented all-union policies but, due to democratic centralism, rigidly directed
lower-level Secretariats￿activities too. The hierarchy of secretaries formed
the ￿party apparatus,￿the corps of full-time professional party functionar-
ies. The party apparatus
[d]etermine[d] key appointments in all party, state, economic,
social, cultural, and military institutions at every level; they ex-
plain[ed] and implement[ed] the policies of the state and party in
all sectors of Soviet life; they check[ed] and ensure[d] the ful￿ll-
ment of party and state directives; they mobilize[d] and manip-
ulate[d] the energies and pressures required for the implemen-
tation of the party￿ s will; they accumulate[d] and organize[d]
information and prepare[d] reports and recommendations for ac-
tion, which [were] transmitted to the Politburo; [and] they [kept]
a close tab on public moods and sentiments, report[ed] their im-
pressions to the central authorities, and maintain[ed] an exten-
sive ￿le of dossiers on party members.90
27Party policy, and thus government policy, was what the party apparatus
chose to implement. Moreover,
[a]s the network of local secretaries was absorbed into the
central apparatus and became dependent on it for assignments
and promotions, the secretarial hierarchy emerged as a distinct
group with vested interests of its own. The drive to stabilize
its own position and to extend its authority became an end in
itself... The rising in￿ uence of the General Secretary symbol-
ized its own aspirations; every e⁄ort to delimit his in￿ uence was
construed as an e⁄ort to undermine the power of the apparatus
itself.91
As democratic centralism made the Gensek the party apparatus￿ s logical
standard bearer, the Gensek arrogated power that ensured his indisputable
leadership of the party and thus the Soviet Union.
The system of party elections demonstrates the supremacy of the party
apparatus, and Gensek. Regional party secretaries, beholden to the Gensek,
chose who was on the ballot for elections to the next highest territorial
constituent body.92Then, the delegates in the relevant constituent body reg-
istered their preferences by voting, when party rules were followed, secretly,
for or against each candidate selected by the local secretariat.93Of course,
since the All-Union Party Congress (the CPSU￿ s highest constituent body)
elected the Central Committee and Politburo, the Gensek, short of a sec-
retariat revolt, e⁄ectively selected those bodies and could pack them with
allies.
The Soviet constitutional order, established by the Soviet constitutions
of 1924, 1936, and 1977, created a federal institutional structure, parallel
to the party, that carried out party promulgated state policy. From 1936
onward, the Soviet Union boasted universal su⁄rage. The Soviet electorate
directly chose delegates for local soviets, rayon soviets, and a soviet for every
territorial level parallel to the CPSU territorial bodies, up to the All-Union
Supreme Soviet. Most delegates were CPSU members and subject to party
discipline and, moreover, elections followed the same process as for party
constituent bodies, placing full power in the Secretariat￿ s hands.
Every soviet elect[ed] an executive committee to function
as an administrative and supervisory body, with a chairman
who in e⁄ect function[ed] as the chief administrative o¢ cer of
the unit concerned. At the Union, Union Republic, and Au-
tonomous Republic levels, instead of an executive committee,
28there [was] an elected Presidium and Council of Ministers, each
with a chairman.94
The executive committees exercised authority during the soviets￿ re-
cesses. They controlled the legislative, executive, and judicial power in their
territories and, like the CPSU, lower tier soviets and committees were sub-
ordinate to those of higher territorial rank.
The Supreme Soviet was a rubberstamp bicameral legislature, each house
holding equal power. One house, the Soviet of the Union, was directly
elected by the citizenry from single member districts while the other, the
Soviet of Nationalities, included representatives of the federal units and
gave each national unit equal representation. The soviets had a remark-
ably high turnover rate, about two-thirds of delegates at each session being
new.95Each house had a ￿council of elders,￿ which was primarily a cere-
monial role awarded for loyally servicing the party. Both chambers devoted
most of their time to listening to Ministers￿reports and enacting government
legislation drawn up between Supreme Soviet plena. The Supreme Soviet
elected a Presidium to wield its power between sessions and a Council of
Ministers (government) to issue executive decrees and implement the legis-
lation enacted by the Supreme Soviet or Presidium. The Supreme Soviet
also amended the Constitution, elected the Supreme Court, and appointed
the Procurator-General.96As party functionaries, the Supreme Soviet￿ s del-
egates￿votes echoed secretariat decisions.
The Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities elected the Pre-
sidium in joint session. The Presidium promulgated decrees, which were
supposed to conform with hitherto passed Supreme Soviet legislation, dur-
ing the Supreme Soviet￿ s recess. While the Presidium promulgated decrees,
the Council of Ministers executed them through their ministries, making
the Council of Ministers the real governing organ. All-Union ministry deci-
sions ￿ltered down to their Union Republic counterparts, which implemented
Moscow￿ s policies at the periphery. The Supreme Soviet￿ s Presidium con-
tained many Politburo and All-Union Secretariat members and the Council
of Ministers was usually almost indistinguishable from the Politburo. The
Council of Ministers, with dozens of ministers and their sta⁄s, like so many
other state and party organs, was unwieldy and delegated a lot of its author-
ity to its own small presidium and chairman, who was often the Gensek.97
The economic system Stalin built upon and expanded outlawed money
lending and all private ownership of capital.98￿Stalin￿ s innovation was to
con￿scate for his own purposes almost the total natural and tangible capital
stock of the country and then to use [those] resources to produce a mix of
29output that was much more intensive in capital goods and other goods Stalin
wanted than would have otherwise been produced.￿ 99Therefore, Soviet cit-
izens only earned income by labor. Party technocrats set base wages very
low and consumer goods￿prices comparatively high, maximizing the out-
put of goods desired by the authoritarian political elite. To retain natural
worker productivity incentives, the system levied ￿little or no implicit taxa-
tion on extra, overtime, above-the-norm or ￿ bonus￿work and productivity￿
and made use of progressive piece rates that increased the per-unit payment
with the amount a person produced.100Stalin applied the system most bru-
tally on the former agricultural landowners (kulaks). Stalin collectivized
agriculture in his ￿rst ￿ve year plan (1928-1933) to make certain kulaks met
their output quotas to the state before selling practically untaxed output
produced on their tiny CPSU allocated private plots on the market. Put
simply, the economy of the workers￿paradise operated much like the slave
economy of the antebellum South in the United States..
Unlike the economy of the antebellum South, the Soviet￿ s relied on CPSU
technocrats￿direction. Managers needed to collect and exploit an enormous
amount of information to coordinate their activities with other managers
and execute the CPSU elite￿ s decisions. Competition with other managers
for greater production to procure promotion and other bureaucrats￿incen-
tive to prove to their superiors that fault for any shortages, low quality
goods, or less than expected production possibility estimates lay elsewhere
discouraged managers from skimming resources, understating production
possibilities, and feeding misinformation casting themselves in a more fa-
vorable light. Astute superiors could usually uncover shirking or graft by
looking for output discrepancies between factories or farms that produced
the same goods.101
However, the surveillance system foundered once managers forsook com-
petition for collusion. Because all output belonged to the state, managers
had no inherent incentive to protect it and deliver all of it. Without Stalin-
ist purges eliminating collusive links, the links metastasized both vertically
(with managers colluding with inferiors and superiors to split stolen output)
and horizontally (with managers in nominally competing factories or farms
colluding together). As the collusive links expanded, those colluding pilfered
more output, reducing government revenue.102
304 The Durability of Regimes
Measured by the amount of capital owned by the elite, by the middle class,
and by the citizenry, it is clear that economic inequality characterized the in-
stitutionally engendered economic systems of both Argentina and Francoist
Spain. Since capital generated the personal income of the elite, while the
citizens￿income came from labor, wide income di⁄erentials existed. There-
fore, inequality was always acute enough to provide incentives to citizens to
oppose the regime. Moreover, it implied enough of a redistributive reward
to make revolutionary activity extremely pro￿table.
Conversely, in the non-collusive Soviet economic model, almost all in-
come accrued from labor, meaning income di⁄erentials originated nearly
exclusively from wage disparities, e⁄ectively imposing relative egalitarian-
ism and greatly diminishing the value of redistribution and the economic
returns of revolutionary activity. After Khrushchev delivered his 1956 de-
Stalinization speech and the Stalinist ￿Anti-Party Group￿ s￿1957 extirpa-
tion, vertical and horizontal collusive syndicates surfaced that illegally in-
creased inequality. The politically connected had better opportunities to
steal state assets and could buyo⁄ or threaten to use their political leverage
to harm the politically inconsequential people who protested. However, the
inequality was not nearly as marked as in Argentina and Spain, and was
kept secret.
The CPSU￿ s economic power issued from its dictatorial management
of the country￿ s capital stock and its monopoly on privileged information.
Later, many Soviet factory and farm managers accrued power by stealing
public industrial and agricultural output. Democratization in Argentina or
Spain meant a more redistributive tax rate but the economic elites would
still survive. Conversely, the Soviet elite￿ s status depended on the nature of
the particular system from which it bene￿ted. With democracy, the CPSU
could no longer direct the economy and the managers￿parasitic syndicates
would vanish from competition. Therefore, while the citizenry￿ s economic
incentive to topple the system was trivial, the political elites had a strong
interest in protecting the system. Consequently, Soviet collective preferences
were comparatively less inclined to regime change than their Argentine and
Spanish counterparts.
As regards political power, the Argentine military elite lost the least
from abdication because power was less concentrated in their hands than in
Franco￿ s or than in the apparatus of the CPSU, because it had a place to go
(the barracks), and because it retained more de facto power than the other
systems. The Argentine military could, and did, negotiate an agreeable
31transition to democracy, securing painful concessions from the oppositional
Moderates. These concessions included the ￿National Paci￿cation Law,￿
giving amnesty to the perpetrators of the ￿Dirty War￿ . Moreover, whenever
the military brass felt their civilian successors were reneging on their side of
the bargain, their institutional autonomy allowed them to threaten another
coup.
Unlike the Argentine junta, Francoism concentrated power in one man.
While an army can retain a healthy bargaining leverage, a single man loses
it. Franco￿ s unparalleled power derived from his exclusive control over cabi-
net and high military appointments and from his masterful ad hoc political
maneuvers to protect his regime. As long as the fascist dictator lived, he
would not accede to institutional transition and could only be ejected via
ruptura. However, once the fascist dictator dies, PET implies that his fran-
gible coalition may (and did in Spain￿ s case) accede to transition, especially
if the members of the new coalition reserve some voice on future choices.
Spain￿ s right proved its electability in 1933. After Franco, the right could
reasonably assume that it could succeed in democratic elections, especially
under a Franco-picked king and with a vigilant politicized military.
The CPSU could have resigned itself to a democratic contestation of
power. After all, many communist parties have fared well at the ballot box,
even in some former Soviet states like Moldova.103However, democratiza-
tion would have stripped the secretariat of control over the CPSU itself.
The dictatorship was of the CPSU apparatus, not the CPSU. The power of
Gensek and the party apparatus ￿ owed from their control over CPSU elec-
tions and personnel distribution. This was only sustainable so long as it was
enforced by the police and military. Moreover, unlike in Spain, the elite was
self-perpetuating. The Secretariat and entire CPSU maintained a reliable
electoral succession protocol to choose a new dictatorial Gensek when one
died in o¢ ce. Only Khrushchev was forced out and it was by an antagonis-
tic CPSU apparatus led by the All-Union Second Secretary, Brezhnev, after
much furtive plotting. They rebelled because they feared that Khrushchev￿ s
1962 decision to divide provincial and local party machines into industrial
and agricultural branches would jeopardize their grip on power.104
In contrast, Gorbachev was not exactly ousted. Recognizing the Soviet
Union￿ s economic duress, he concluded that only economic and political lib-
eralization (glasnost and perestroika) could revitalize the Soviet economy
and narrow the growing gap between American and Soviet output. We
may conjecture that he hoped that by this liberalization he would win the
newly enfranchised masses￿political support and recast himself in the pub-
lic￿ s imagination as a Reformer instead of chief Hardliner, thus becoming the
32new center of a Hardliner-Reformer-Moderate coalition. Gorbachev could
not recreate himself in this way, and the voters chose Yeltsin.
The three regimes examined here could deploy brutal and e¢ cient repres-
sion methods against oppositional citizenry￿ s organization and its e⁄orts to
overcome the collective action problem. However, the Soviet system stands
out for two reasons. First, overcoming the collective action problem requires
paying revolutionaries. This becomes marginally harder as wealth inequal-
ity abates. As detailed above, Soviet citizens gaineded less of a payo⁄ from
income redistribution than the Argentine and Spanish citizens. Second,
many Soviet citizens probably estimated that destroying the hegemony of
the CPSU apparatus might wreak economic chaos, especially because few
Soviet enterprises could withstand any competition.
The Argentine and Spanish governments could not e⁄ectively ￿lter their
decisions into non-military and police organizations and enterprises. The
Argentine junta relied nearly exclusively on the police and military, through
their control over de jure governmental institutions, to enforce their edicts.
However, they could not directly enforce these edicts in factories, cultural
organizations, and universities.. Franco controlled the police and military
too and could also tame and fracture the working class through Falangist
syndicates.
The Gensek and CPSU apparatus not only controlled the police and
military through their command of de jure governmental institutions. They
also controlled every meaningful Soviet organization or enterprise, because
the territorial party hierarchy￿ s tentacles reached into them through PPOs.
The secretariats ￿due to democratic centralism and the vested interest in
preserving secretarial prerogatives ￿enforced the dictator￿ s decisions.
Argentina￿ s junta and Franco￿ s coterie exited via reforma, the compro-
mise transition, as Przeworski has suggesdted. In contrast, the Soviet system
imploded. When Gorbachev weakened the CPSU for his own bene￿t, he cre-
ated incentives for his party subordinates to grab what they could before
the center of power collapsed. This led to a rush to appropriate state assets
￿tearing the system apart by wanton piracy. The key is that no e⁄ectual
Reformers besides the dictator (Gensek) and CPSU apparatus could exist
in the Soviet Union. The economic elites and middle classes (that the Ar-
gentine and Spanish governments needed to stay in power) did not exist
in the Soviet Union. Lenin tried co-option with his New Economic Policy
during the Russian Civil War.105In contrast, Stalin had no need of co-option
because he had expropriated all capital, thus eliminating all who resisted,
and enslaving the rest of the population, making them dependent on PPO
taskmasters.
33A historical analysis demonstrates that party dictatorships are more in-
stitutionally durable than military or fascist ones. That conclusion has
obvious foreign policy implications. Soviet-like party systems, including
China and North Korea, are very unlikely to collapse from internal pres-
sures, though they may fall from external pressure or from reforms from
the top. However, Gorbachev￿ s fate suggest that few party dictatorship
elites will willingly democratize. China is liberalizing its economy but not
its polity, maintaing the dominance of the party apparatus even as reliance
on technocrats increases. Either outright confrontation or dØtente are vi-
able policy approaches towards those states, but there would seem to be no
e⁄ective strategy in between these extemes.
5 Concluding Remarks
Acemoglu, and Robinson (2005) have done a great service to scholarship by
o⁄ering a model that connects democracy and dictatorship. There are four
problems with their analysis that the PET model presented here attempts
to rectify.
Firstly, they work in the Downsian context, where the policy space is one
dimensional.106 This usually means a focus on the con￿ ict between labor and
capital, with the median (or centrist) citizen being pivotal between left and
right. Various recent empirical studues of elections in developed polities
clearly indicate that there is usually a second ￿social￿axis, characterized by
citizens￿preferences on civil rights, sometimes involving religious beliefs, as
in Israel and Turkey. Although the meaning of this social axis varies across
di⁄erent polities, it typically has an interpretation that is consistent with
the notion of the political axis shown in Figure 1.107
Secondly, valence has been shown by the empirical studies to be sta-
tistically relevant in modelling voter choice.108 The valence idea provides a
formal reason why the median citizen will not be pivotal. Instead, asym-
metries in the perception of the citizens of the autocrat and opposition will
cause their ￿equilibrium￿ policy positions to be very di⁄erent. The two
varieties of valence that we use are intended to accomodate two di⁄erent
aspects of a leader￿ s appeal. It is entirely possible that a revolutionary
leader is blindly supported because of his intrinsic valence, or charisma, so
that the policy position chosen by the leader is uncritically supported by the
masses.109 On the other hand, a charismatic leader, such as Castro or Lenin,
can gain even more support by articulating revolutionary policies that are
opposed to those of the autocrat. This second aspect of valence we formally
34model by the notion of activist (or policy dependent) valence. An autocrat￿ s
reponse to opposition will depend on the degree to which the opposition is
united. For example, a fragmented opposition will tend to be characterized
by the low valence of its leaders. An equilibrium response would be to ac-
comodate the demands, by adopting a position close to a weighted electoral
mean. This weighted mean takes account of whatever support there is in the
citizenry for the leader. The discussion, above, about Gorbachev￿ s strategy
suggests that his policy position was adopted due to an incorrect belief on
his part about the low valence of the opposition.
The third key point is the high dimensionality of the factor space. We
have tended to emphasize the possibility of collusion between the autocrat
and capital. In less developed, capital poor economies, a more likely coalition
is between the landed elite interest and the autocrat, with a revolutionary
leader promising land reform. It is probable that a leader such as Mugabe
in Zimbabwe was able to take power initially by such promises. It seems,
however, that Mugabe has maintained his control by a strategy based on
manipulation of capital. By the device of an arti￿cial exchange rate, avail-
able only to his cronies, he has destroyed the wage rate, and probably the
factor price of land, even as the citizens were impoverished. While his in-
trinsic valence has fallen, the fragmented opposition and the support of his
clique has allowed him to keep power.
The fourth point is related to the ￿rst. In the empirical studies noted
above, the intrinsic valence of a political leader is a measure of the ￿quality￿
of the leader as viewed by the citizens. This will vary among the population,
and it assumed to be distributed in a stochastic fashion.110 However, in
the empirical analyses of elections, it is possible to use sociodemographic
characteristics of citizens as an additional source of information in modelling
political choice. Formally, this can be interpreted as allowing leader valences
to be very di⁄erent in the various, heterogenous segments of the society. It is
obvious enough that, in a fragmented society such as Iraq, with the autocrat
removed, the valences of the political leaders may be so heterogenous that
civil war ensues. We have not discussed how exactly the intrinsic valence of
leaders is generated or determined, though some ideas about this have been
presented in recent work .111.
As Collier has noted, approximately 750 million poor people in the world
are either in the midst of, or have recently been exposed to, civil war.112
A version of the PET model presented here, consistent with the work of
Wantchekon, could provide some insight into why poor societies seem to be
subject to fragmented factions, leading either to the imposition of autocracy
or to the chaos of civil war.
356 Appendix : A Political Economy Model of Leader
Support
The model presented here is an extension of the standard multiparty sto-
chastic model, modi￿ed by inducing asymmetries in terms of valence.
The key idea underlying the formal model is that political leaders at-
tempt to estimate the e⁄ects of their policy positions on the support they
receive. Each leader, whether autocrat or opposition, chooses the policy
position as best responses to opposing position(s), in order to maximize
their own support. The stochastic model essentially assumes that leaders
cannot predict support precisely, but can estimate an expected support. In
the model with valence, the stochastic element is associated with the weight
given by each citizen, i, to the average perceived quality or valence of the
party leader.
De￿nition 1. The Stochastic Model E(￿;￿;￿;￿) with Activist Va-
lence:
The data of the spatial model is a distribution, fxi 2 W : i 2 Pg, of
voter ideal points for the members of the selectorate, P, of size p. By the
selectorate we mean those citizens who have some potential to in￿ uence
political choice. We assume that W is a open, convex subset of Euclidean
space, Rw, with w ￿nite. Each of the leaders in the set N = f1;:::;j;:::;ng
chooses a policy, zj 2 W, to declare. Let z = (z1;:::;zn) 2 Wn be a typical
vector of leader positions.
Given z, each citizen, i, is described by a vector
ui(xi;z) = (ui1(xi;z1);:::;uip(xi;zn))
where
uij(xi;zj) = ￿j + ￿j(zj) ￿ ￿jjxi ￿ zjjj2 + ￿j = u￿
ij(xi;zj) + ￿j: (1)
Here u￿
ij(xi;zj) is the observable component of utility. The term, ￿j;
is the ￿xed or exogenous valence of leader j, while the function ￿j(zj) is
the component of valence generated by activist contributions to leader j:
The term ￿ is a positive constant, called the spatial parameter, giving the
importance of policy di⁄erence de￿ned in terms of the Euclidean metric,
jja ￿ bjj; on W. The vector ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿j;:::;￿n) is the stochastic error,
whose multivariate cumulative distribution will be denoted by ￿:
It is assumed that the exogenous valence vector
￿ = (￿1;￿2;:::;￿n) satis￿es ￿n ￿ ￿n￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿1:
36Citizen behavior is modelled by a probability vector. The probability
that a citizen i chooses leader j at the vector z is
￿ij(z) = Pr[[uij(xi;zj) > uil(xi;zl)], for all l 6= j]: (2)
= Pr[￿l ￿ ￿j < u￿
ij(xi;zj) ￿ u￿
il(xi;zj), for all l 6= j] (3)
Here Pr stands for the probability operator generated by the distribution
assumption on ￿.







The di⁄erentiable function V : Wn ! Rn is called the leader pro￿le
function.
In democratic polities, sij is usually assumed to be 1 for all i;j: In fact
because of electoral systems, the weight sij may di⁄er between di⁄erent
voters i in P: In non-democratic polities the weights sij may di⁄er widely.
In the following it is assumed that the stochastic errors have the Type
I extreme value (or Gumbel) distribution,￿: The formal model based on ￿
parallels the empirical models based on multinomial logit (MNL) estimation.113
De￿nition 2. The Extreme Value Distribution,￿:
The cumulative distribution,￿; has the closed form
￿(x) = exp[￿exp[￿x]];
with probability density function
 (x) = exp[￿x]exp[￿exp[￿x]]
and variance 1
6￿2:
The di⁄erence between the Gumbel and normal (or Gaussian) distribu-
tions is that the latter is perfectly symmetric about zero.










In this stochastic electoral model it is assumed that each leader j chooses
zj to maximize Vj, conditional on z￿j = (z1;:::;zj￿1;zj+1;:::;zn).
37De￿nition 3. Equilibrium Concepts.





n) 2 Wn is a local
strict Nash equilibrium (LSNE) for the pro￿le function V : Wn ! Rn i⁄,
for each leader j 2 N;there exists a neighborhood Wj of z￿











for all zj 2 Wj ￿ fz￿
jg:





n) is a local weak
Nash equilibrium (LNE) i⁄, for each agent j;there exists a neighborhood
Wj of z￿











for all zj 2 Wj:





n) is a strict or
weak, pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE or PNE) i⁄ Wj can be re-
placed by W in (i),(ii) respectively.
(iv) The strategy z￿
j is termed a ￿local strict best response,￿ a ￿local







Obviously if z￿ is an LSNE or a PNE it must be an LNE, while if it
is a PSNE then it must be an LSNE. We use the notion of LSNE to avoid
problems with the degenerate situation when there is a zero eigenvalue to the
Hessian. The weaker requirement of LNE allows us to obtain a necessary
condition for z￿ to be a LNE and thus a PNE, without having to invoke






We ￿rst transform coordinates so that in the new coordinate system, x￿ = 0.
We shall refer to z0 = (0;:::;0) as the selectorate origin.
The Theorem shows that z0 = (0;:::;0) will generally not satisfy the
￿rst order condition for a LSNE, namely that the di⁄erential of Vj; with
respect to zj be zero. However, if the activist valence function is identically
zero, so that only exogenous valence is relevant, then the ￿rst order condition
at z0 will be satis￿ed.
It follows that for voter i, with ideal point, xi; the probability, ￿ij(z);
that i picks j at z is given by
￿ij(z) = [1 + ￿k6=j[exp(fjk)]]￿1 (7)
38where fjk = ￿k + ￿k(zk) ￿ ￿j ￿ ￿j(zj) + ￿jjxi ￿ zjjj2 ￿ ￿jjxi ￿ zkjj2:
Scho￿eld114 shows that the ￿rst order condition for z￿ to be a LSNE is that
it be a balance solution.
De￿nition 4. The balance solution for the model E(￿;￿;￿;￿):
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be the matrix of coe¢ cients. The balance equation for z￿
























Notice ￿rst that the weight ￿ij shows how the citizen i in￿ uence leader j
in his choice of policy position. Moreover, the weights for leader j depend on
the vector of positions {z￿jg of leaders other than j: The balance equation












The bracketed term on the left of this expression is termed the mar-
ginal electoral pull of leader j and is a gradient vector pointing towards
this leader￿ s weighted electoral mean. This position is that point where the
electoral pull is zero. The vector
d￿j
dzj is called the marginal activist pull for
leader j.
If z￿ = (z￿
1;::z￿
j;::z￿
n) satis￿es the balance equation for this vector of
positions; then call z￿ the balance solution.
In the case ￿j = 0 for all j; then if all weights sij are identical, it can be
shown that for each ￿xed j, all ￿ij are identical. Thus, when there is only








39By a change of coordinates we can choose 1
p￿xi = 0: In this case, the mar-
ginal electoral pull is zero at the origin and the joint origin z0 = (0;:::;0)
satis￿es the ￿rst order condition. However, there is a necessary condition
based on the parameters ￿; ￿ and the electoral variance that must be sat-
is￿ed for z0 to be an LSNE.
Theorem.
(i) Consider the electoral model E(￿;￿;￿;￿) based on the Type I ex-
treme value distribution, and including both exogenous and activist valences.
The ￿rst order condition for z* to be an LSNE is that it is a balance so-
lution. If all activist valence functions are highly concave, in the sense of
having negative eigenvalues of su¢ ciently great magnitude, then the balance
solution will be a PNE.115
(ii) If ￿ = 0; then there is a coe¢ cient, c; de￿ned in terms of all para-
meters and the electoral variance of preferred points such that c < w is a
necessary condition for z0 to be a LSNE.116
We conclude by emphasizing that the marginal electoral pull of leader j is
a gradient vector pointing towards the weighted electoral mean of the leader,
and represents the centripetal pull to the center. The marginal activist pull
for leader j represents the centrifugal force generated by the resources made
available by activists.
In principle, this model can be used to examine the equilibrium posi-
tion of a political leader, responding to activist demands, and balancing
the pull of the selectorate, in order to gain resources that can be used to
compete with political opponents. Even without activists, convergence to a
centrist position, as in the Downsian model, is impossible if the population
is su¢ ciently heterogenous in its beliefs or preferences.
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